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The basic assumptions of Karen Stenner’s authoritarian dynamics theory are 
tested in this paper. The idea of the theory is that there is no difference in 
normal situations in tolerance between authoritarian and non-authoritarian indi-
viduals. Only the situation of normative threat leads to the fact that people with 
authoritarian predispositions react by increasing their intolerance. As a conse-
quence, we can expect an increase in authoritarianism-tolerance correlation in 
situations of present threat compared with those without such threat present. In 
the paper, we empirically corroborate this increased correlation in the areas that 
have gone through interethnic conflicts, as among people who feel threatened 
by the return of refugees or by the European Union. These results are based on 
the data collected in the areas of intensive conflict during the wars of Yugoslav 
disintegration (Gospić, Plaški, Pakrac) compared with those that stayed peaceful 
(Vrbovsko, Rovinj, Daruvar).
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One of the key topics of modern social psychology is the explanation of 
authoritarianism.* Beginning with the classical study of Adorno and col-
laborators (1950), the goal was to explain why some people don’t tolerate 
those who are different. This explanation has tremendous practical impor-
tance. The context and motivation for the Adorno study was the explana-
tion of the rise of Nazism in Germany. From that time on we have had a 
whole array of examples of authoritarian and totalitarian movements that 
made the question posed by this classical study even more important. The 
* This paper is the result of the research project “Social Integration and Collective Iden-
tity in Multiethnic Areas of Croatia”, which has been carried out with the support of the 
Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia.
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Authoritarian Personality triggered a continuous stream of research with 
constant conceptual and methodological improvements. I will not elaborate 
this whole development here but will concentrate on one conceptual in-
novation. This innovation has its roots already in the works of Fromm and 
Reich (1970). One of the key points of Fromm’s Escape from Freedom 
(1941) is that the appeal of Nazism to German workers can be function-
ally explained as a release from uncertainty, insecurity and lack of direction 
in people, which was produced by modern capitalism. The Nazi ideology 
freed workers from the feeling of threat imposed by modern society and 
promised security, with the Jews as scapegoats. Very similar ideas were de-
veloped by Reich who ascribed the roots of support for Hitler to the loss of 
security and identity prevalent in the Weimar republic. In the more recent 
literature, the same ideas have been developed by Staub (1989). Based on 
case studies of Nazi Germany, Turkey, Cambodia and Argentina, he argues 
that economic decline, social disorder and change lead to lower group es-
teem and frustration, because people feel that their way of life and their 
values are in danger. That creates a need to restore psychological security 
and the endangered self-concept. This is achieved by intensifying attach-
ment to the in-group and by derogation of the out-groups. Under the right 
conditions of authoritarian culture and the presence of political leadership, 
that encourages ethnocentrism, nationalism and out-group aggression and 
this derogation can evolve into use of force and genocide. The process of 
derogation of out-groups is also a part of the social identity theory (Tajfel, 
1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986), where the individuals with the threat-
ened social identity seek to restore that identity by positively differentiating 
the in-group and denigrating the out-group.
What is common to these theoretical approaches is that they emphasize 
the importance of situational factors that act as triggers for expression of 
authoritarianism, violence and genocide. We can say that the conceptual 
contribution of these books was in shifting of emphasis from the person-
ality traits toward the social context, situation, or to be more precise, of 
interaction between the context and personality traits.
Within this theoretical framework, we have had a whole array of em-
pirical works confirming the connection with an increase in authoritarian-
ism in threatening situations. Sales (1972) concluded that, in periods of 
presumed social threat, we have an increase of conversion to fundamen-
talist denominations. The same author finds that we have an increase in 
these periods in police budgets, harsher punishment for sex-offenders and 
a prevalence of power themes in TV and comic books (Sales, 1973). Doty, 
Peterson and Winter (1991) have found that the perception of threat is 
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correlated with power themes on TV and in comics, with an increase in 
censorship attempts, support for conservative political candidates, reports 
on KKK (Ku Klux Klan) activities and with the readiness to express preju-
dices in survey responses. In the detailed analysis of the rise of the radi-
cal right in Europe, Rydgren (2002, 2003) concludes that its growth can 
best be explained by the fragmentation of culture and widespread political 
discontent and disenchantment. That could be compared with the disillu-
sionment and insecurity during the era preceding the rise of Nazism and 
Fascism. Altemeyer (1996) also finds correlation between perception of the 
world as dangerous and intolerant.
One summary of the research on authoritarianism in the former Yugo-
slavia was given by Šiber (1989). He came to the conclusion that authori-
tarianism is correlated with ethnocentrism and social distance and can, as 
such, create a predisposition for the expression of underlying national ten-
sions. Another important characteristic of authoritarians is uncritical accept-
ance of ideologies, especially if advocated by sources accepted as legiti-
mate and reliable. In accordance with these assumptions, the explanation of 
the successful mobilization for ethnic conflict and violence in the Yugoslav 
wars can be found, according to Županov, Sekulić and Šporer (1996), in 
widespread authoritarianism. Media monopoly allowed manipulation of the 
feelings of threat and authoritarian predispositions made people malleable 
and easily mobilized.
The next step in the formulation of the theory of authoritarian per-
sonality was made by redefining it in the direction of interaction between 
context and personality characteristics. One of the most systematic formula-
tions of this theory can be found in the work of Feldman (2003). According 
to him, the main source of authoritarianism is the fundamental dilemma 
between the desire for order (which leads to conformism) and the desire 
for freedom (which leads to personal autonomy). But these fundamental 
differences are influencing different behaviour and attitudes only under the 
condition of threat. In the normal situation, the conformist and the “autono-
mist” will manifest the same attitudes and behaviour. Under the situation 
of perceived threat, the difference will arise with the conformists increasing 
their intolerance and prejudice. Similar results were obtained by Haddock, 
Zanna and Esses (1993). In their research, perceived value conflict was a 
predictor of prejudice only among those high on authoritarianism. The most 
extensive formulation and testing of these assumptions can be found in the 
work of Stenner (2005). The authoritarian dynamic is a process in which an 
enduring individual predisposition (authoritarianism) interacts with chang-
ing environmental conditions. The situation of threat and especially of 
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“normative threat” produces manifest expressions of intolerance. In this 
theory, authoritarianism is defined as a stable predisposition, which can 
be detected by an impressive coherence among individuals in the form of 
attitudes and behaviours rejecting diversity and insisting on sameness. The 
authoritarian predisposition produces attitudes and behaviours in different 
areas of social life and social interactions, enhancing sameness and mini-
mizing diversity between people, beliefs and attitudes. This enhancement 
of uniformity requires control over “Others” and, in the final instance, even 
their coercion in order to minimize variation and increase sameness. The 
group authority is called upon in order to enforce this coercion. The author 
came to the conclusion that the most valid indicators of authoritarianism 
are child-rearing values. These child-rearing values are tapping the funda-
mental orientation toward authority/uniformity versus autonomy/difference, 
between the parental authority and child autonomy and between conform-
ity to rules and thinking for oneself. By using the child-rearing values, the 
author argues that the tautology of many authoritarianism measures can 
be avoided. Namely, when we construct the indicators of authoritarianism 
by using the indices from the political area or that of race relations and 
than correlate our authoritarianism indicator to political or racial, ethnic or 
national attitudes, the result is tautological because we have the same indi-
ces within the assumed independent and dependent variables. By using the 
indices of this microcosm of  family life, we avoid this danger.
The influence of threat on racial intolerance, political intolerance, mor-
al intolerance and general intolerance (measured by F scale and RWA /
Right Wing Authoritarianism/ scales) was explored using experimental and 
survey techniques. In the experimental situations, it was suggested by the 
experimenter to the subjects that belief diversity in society is increasing 
and that political leaders are of low quality. Reactions of authoritarians 
and non-authoritarians to these descriptions were compared. The percep-
tion of normative threat was taken in the surveys as an intervening vari-
able. In general, the results show that the general theory is corroborated 
in both situations (experimental manipulation and surveys). When authori-
tarians are convinced by experimental manipulation that normative threat 
is present, their intolerance increases. In the surveys, when people with 
authoritarian predispositions perceive the normative threat, their intolerance 
also increases. However, the obtained results in the situation of non-existent 
threat were also in accordance with the theoretical prediction. When there 
is no experimentally manipulated or perceived normative threat, there is no 
difference in tolerance between authoritarians and libertarians. This fact ex-
plains the sometimes puzzling findings of the existence or non-existence of 
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authoritarianism-tolerance correlations. If the situation (of normative threat) 
is not taken into account, there is no reason to expect to find the differ-
ence. In the “normal” situations, the authoritarians are no less tolerant than 
libertarians. If a survey is undertaken in such non-threatening situations, the 
results are disappointing because no correlation between authoritarianism 
and tolerance occurs. Contrary to this, the correlation occurs in the situation 
of perceived normative threat.
Question, research design and variables
Question
Previous research indicates that the high intolerance and nationalism in the 
former Yugoslavia and Croatia actually did not precede the war and atroci-
ties, but was more a consequence of these events. The current research 
presents expansion of the previous explanations by exploring the role of 
authoritarianism in the rise of national intolerance. Can we assume, in ac-
cordance with the authoritarian dynamics theory, that the observed rise in 
intolerance was mediated by authoritarianism? In that case, the observed 
difference diagnosed in the paper by Sekulić, Massey and Hodson (2006) 
could be explained by the fact that people with authoritarian predispositions 
increased their intolerance as a reaction to the threatening situation ac-
companying the dissolution of the state. The idea is a very simple one and 
based on comparison of threatening and normal situations with expectations 
that threatening situations will provoke people with authoritarian predispo-
sitions to express intolerance, whereas non-authoritarians will even increase 
their tolerant attitudes, as previous results by Stenner (2005) indicate. As 
a consequence, we will have an increased correlation of authoritarianism-
intolerance based on the gap between those with present or absent au-
thoritarian predispositions in situations of threat, whereas this gap will be 
non-existent in normal situations.
Threatening situations
The contextual variable that is producing the difference between authori-
tarians and non-authoritarians is threat. In the original theory by Stenner 
(2005), not every type of threat will produce this difference. The type of 
threat that is relevant is normative threat, namely the perception that the 
group, community or society in question is threatened by deep polarization 
of opinions, ideological disagreements, or by leaders who don’t express 
values that predominate in the community. Because the quest for sameness 
lies in the background of authoritarianism, everything that endangers that 
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sameness, to which the individual feels attached, will provoke an increase 
in authoritarianism. The whole theoretical framework is based on interac-
tion between the situation (context) and the personality predisposition. In 
her book, Stenner (2005) measures threat using experimental manipulation 
and survey data. Subjects in the experimental situations were induced to 
exposure by classical normative threats like the increased polarization of 
public opinions. For example, they were presented with statements like 
“The American people disagree about a much wider range of issues and 
disagree much more strongly than at any time in the last thirty years”. Or 
they were confronted with the statement that the modern U.S. presidents 
have been “remarkably lacking in strength, vision, substance, intelligence 
and principle”. Exposure to such statements increased intolerance among 
those with authoritarian predispositions. Questions in the surveys dealing 
with leaders’ trait evaluations, perceptions of ideological distance from the 
major political parties, perceptions of ideological distance from “typical 
Americans”, and perceptions of belief divergence among “typical Ameri-
cans” and “members of Congress” were used to distinguish between those 
who feel threatened by the existing situations and those who don’t.
In any research, there is always a question of whether the fact that the 
results do not fit the expectations derived from the theory is a consequence 
of the theory being wrong, or that the indicators used are not a good meas-
ure of the concepts that are part of the theory. For example, Stenner (2005) 
has found that personal threat does not increase intolerance among author-
itarians to the extent that normative threat does. (Interestingly, personal 
threat does increase intolerance among non-authoritarians; however, we are 
not discussing here the details and consequences of this finding because it 
lies outside of the scope of our interest in this case.)
In order to avoid the second danger, (that we fail to corroborate the 
theory because of inadequate indicators) it is very important how we op-
erationalize them. The main problem in our research is the operationaliza-
tion of the situation of threat. If we create indicators that fail to capture 
the difference between the threatening and non-threatening situations, we 
cannot expect the assumed difference between authoritarians and non-au-
thoritarians to emerge.
Measurement of threat
We will use two ways to measure threat. One will be the “natural ex-
periment” of comparing a sample of territories in Croatia in which local 
conflict occurred during the last war with those in which peace was pre-
served. In that way, we will be applying one of the experimental meth-
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ods used by Stenner (2005), but in the form of the “natural” and not the 
laboratory experiment. The second measure is based on a set of survey 
questions dividing the sample into those who feel threatened and those 
who don’t.
Areas of peace and areas of conflict
The data used here were obtained from six multiethnic towns/municipali-
ties in Croatia: Gospić, Plaški, Vrbovsko, Pakrac, Rovinj and Daruvar. 
Our sample was made up of 809 respondents from these six areas. We are 
concentrating on the relations between the Croatian majority and Serbian 
minority, although significant proportions of other minorities are present 
in some of these areas (for example Italians in Rovinj and Czechs in 
Daruvar). Gospić, Plaški and Pakrac were areas of very intensive conflict 
during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It should be mentioned that these 
are also areas in which national conflicts were present during the Second 
World War. Unlike them, Vrbovsko, Rovinj and Daruvar are multiethnic 
areas in which either peace was preserved throughout the 1990s (Rovinj 
and Vrbovsko) or, despite the warfare in the immediate vicinity and ac-
companying social disturbances, co-existence was maintained (the case of 
Daruvar).
We interpreted the fact of occurrence of local conflict as the occur-
rence of threat. It cannot be taken for granted that this can be regarded 
automatically as a measure of threat in the sense required by the theory. 
Firstly, it is not a normative threat in the symbolic sense but an actual 
conflict. We can indirectly assume that the visible conflict in the local 
community is interpreted by those affected as normative threat. The sec-
ond reason is that it is questionable if the feeling of normative threat arises 
only (or to the same extent) in the communities where conflict occurred. 
We can assume that, even in the communities where local conflict did not 
happen, the fact of the surrounding conflict was enough to provoke the 
feeling of threat. In other words, it is questionable whether the difference 
between occurrences of conflict on the local level is the independent vari-
able provoking different feelings of threat. The fact of the general war 
in the surrounding areas could also act on the feeling of threat, erasing 
the difference between areas in which direct conflict occurred and those 
in which it didn’t. It is possible that authoritarians are reacting not to 
the events in the immediate surroundings but to the general situation. On 
the other hand, if we were to find difference between these areas in the 
expected direction, that would be a strong confirmation of the validity of 
the theoretical assumption.
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The main hypothesis
We interpret the fact that people went through conflict in their area of 
living as the activation of threat. According to the hypothesis, authoritar-
ians living in the conflict areas would become less tolerant than in the 
areas were the direct conflict did not occur. Consequently, the correla-
tion of the authoritarian predisposition and the measures of tolerance will 
be greater in the areas that went through conflict than in the peaceful 
areas.
Indicators of authoritarianism and different forms of tolerance
We will be using two different measures of authoritarianism. One will be 
an index of authoritarianism1 and the other the question of child-rearing 
practices.2
We will use the index of individual tolerance,3 the index of national 
exclusion,4 and the index of stereotype5 as dependent variables. As the 
measures of threat we used two basic measures. The first one was, as 
mentioned above, the peace and conflict areas. The assumption is that the 
situation of conflict will act as a threat and activate intolerance among 
individuals with authoritarian predispositions. As a consequence, the dif-
ference between authoritarians and non-authoritarians will be greater in 
1 The index of authoritarianism was obtained in two steps. In the first step, a principal 
component analysis of 19 statements was performed. A second factor explaining 11.71% 
of variance and comprising 7 statements was obtained and labelled authoritarianism. The 
statements are: People without a leader are like a man without a head, The most important 
thing for children is to learn to obey their parents, Care about the family must be the main 
goal of every state, There are two kind of people in  the world – strong and weak, A strong 
state is something that we all need, The main goal of  the state is to ensure order, The state 
must play a larger role in managing the economy. The scale has Cronbach Alpha .711.
2 In accordance with Stenner, we extracted one question: The most important thing for 
children is to learn to obey their parents.
3 The individual tolerance index was based on agreement with five statements: It does 
not bother me if I have to co-operate at work with members of different nationalities; I 
choose friends with regard to their character and not their nationality; I have good rela-
tions with my neighbours regardless of their nationality; I am visited by and have coffee 
parties with neighbours of different nationalities; I am helping my neighbours regardless 
of their nationality.
4 The index of national exclusion is based on three questions: It’s good that people of differ-
ent nationalities marry; It’s good that we have separate classes in school for members of dif-
ferent ethnic groups; It’s not good that people of different nationalities make friendships.
5 The index of stereotypes is constructed on the basis of acceptance or rejection of seven 
statements claiming that members of different ethnic groups are equally industrial, honest, 
tolerant, pious, polite, approachable, and conflict-avoiding.
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conflict areas and, as a result, the correlation of authoritarianism and our 
measures of tolerance, national exclusion and stereotypes will be higher 
in conflict areas.
It can be argued that peace/conflict areas do not sufficiently distin-
guish between situations of existence or non-existence of threat. Namely, 
the whole of Yugoslavia was an arena of conflict and people felt threat-
ened regardless of whether the conflict occurred in their area or a neigh-
bouring one. The point is that we are assuming that the feeling of threat 
was higher in the areas of conflict, but we don’t have the independent 
indicators showing this to have been the case. In order to check the theory, 
we used two different measures of threat that are not connected with the 
difference between peace and conflict areas and the former conflict in Yu-
goslavia. These measures are oriented toward the feeling of threat under 
some contemporary situations and developments. We checked how people 
feel threatened by the return of refugees and how they feel threatened 
with the prospects of entering the European Union. Again, the idea of the 
theory is that the feeling of threat (from the return of refugees or Croatia 
entering the EU) will activate the authoritarian predisposition and these 
people will be more intolerant, exclusionist and stereotyping. In other 
words, the correlation of authoritarianism and intolerance, and exclusion-
ism and stereotyping will be greater among those who feel threatened (by 
the return of refugees or the prospect of entering Europe) than by those 
who don’t feel that way.
The results
When we compare the areas where the conflict occurs with the “peaceful” 
areas, we find a statistically significant difference in the authoritarianism 
levels.
Table 1. Differences in authoritarianism between peaceful and conflict 
areas
Peace/conflict N Mean Std. Error Sig. (2-tailed)
Peace 422 3.77 .03097 Equal variances assumed .001
Conflict 386 3.92 .02913 Equal variances not assumed .001
As we can see, the level of authoritarianism (the mean) is higher in 
conflict than in peaceful areas. This difference of 0.15 points on the 1 
to 5 scale is not large but is statistically significant. The explanation of 
substantive reasons for this difference will not occupy us here. On the 
one hand, it could be the consequence of conflict (the level of authori-
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tarianism rising among the people in the areas passing through conflict). 
On the other hand, we can construct the opposite explanation that the 
authoritarianism was already higher in the conflict areas and was one 
of the factors causing the conflict. Alternatively, the difference could 
be the result of the differential migration with less authoritarian people 
leaving the conflict areas and moving to the more peaceful areas. It is 
difficult without longitudinal data to adjudicate between these different 
hypotheses. To find the answer is not important from the standpoint of 
the problems preoccupying us here. What we are interested in is the ques-
tion of whether the correlation between authoritarianism and tolerance is 
higher or not in the conflict areas than in the peaceful areas. In order 
to have the complete answer to the “authoritarian dynamic” hypothesis 
we should have the data before and after the conflict. According to the 
hypothesis, the correlation would be non-existent before the conflict and 
would emerge as significant in conflict areas (but not in the peaceful ar-
eas) after the conflict. We don’t have the data before the conflict, but we 
can check if the post-conflict data are in accordance with the theoretical 
expectations.
In order to obtain the answers to our hypotheses, the data in the Ta-
ble 2 are presented. The table shows Pearson r, first between individual 
authoritarianism and tolerance, national exclusion and the stereotyping in-
dex. We have the results in the first row for the total sample, while in 
the second and the third rows the result is partitioned into the peace and 
conflict areas according to descriptions previously presented. In the sec-
ond part of the table, the whole procedure is repeated but, instead of the 
authoritarianism index, the child-rearing question is used as an indicator 
of authoritarianism.
Does the obtained data support the authoritarian dynamics theory? 
The general answer is a qualified yes. Namely, the theory assumes that, 
in a situation of threat (the assumed threat situation here is the con-
flict to which the area was exposed), the correlation of authoritarian-
ism (measured here using the authoritarian index) and tolerance measures 
(measured here using three indexes of tolerance, national exclusion and 
stereotyping) will be higher than in the areas not going through the con-
flict process. The correlations in all cases are as expected by the theory, 
namely, higher in the areas that went through conflict. What is clouding 
the interpretation is the fact that all correlations are low and, except in 
two or three cases (depending on criteria), do not reach a statistically 
significance level.
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Table 2. The correlation of authoritarianism and tolerance, stereotyping 
and national exclusion in peaceful and conflict areas
Sample Independent variables Dependent variables Pearson r Sig. N
Total Authoritarianism 
index
Tolerance index -.091 (.010) 807
Peace “ “ -.056 (.124) 421
Conflict “ “ -.077 (.066) 386
Total “ National exclusion 
index .014 (.686) 807
Peace “ “ -.027 (.287) 422
Conflict “ “ .015 (.385) 385
Total “ Stereotyping index .041 (.247) 806
Peace “ “ -.034 (.245) 421
Conflict “ “ .089 (.041) 385
Total Child-rearing 
questions
Tolerance index -.056 (.113) 805
Peace “ “ -.010 (.418) 420
Conflict “ “ -.061 (.115) 385
Total “ National exclusion 
index .022 (.526) 805
Peace “ “ .007 (.441) 421
Conflict “ “ 013 (.400) 384
Total “ Stereotyping index .019 (.598) 804
Peace “ “ -.015 (.377) 420
Conflict “ “ .034 (.351) 384
We should not be confused by the signs pointing in different directions, 
because the direction depends on the question formulation. For example, the 
first correlation between authoritarianism and individual tolerance is in the 
conflict areas -.056 and in peaceful areas -.077. This result is in accordance 
with the theoretical expectation because the greater scale values are point-
ing in the direction of greater tolerance. That means that the correlation of 
intolerance (lower tolerance) and authoritarianism is greater -.077 in the 
conflict areas than in peaceful areas, where the correlation is -.056. If we 
look at the significance test we can see that  the correlation is not signifi-
cant in the peaceful areas while it almost reaches the .05 significance level 
in the conflict areas. Two others scales in the first panel of Table 1 show 
different directions. They are pointing toward greater national exclusionism 
and greater stereotyping. The shifts from the negative to the positive sign in 
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both cases are again in accordance with the theoretical expectation, because 
that means that the correlation of authoritarianism and national exclusion-
ism and stereotyping is becoming positive in conflict areas, whereas it is 
negative and statistically insignificant in the peaceful areas.
That means that in all three cases in the first panel of the Table 1 
(using the index of authoritarianism as the measure of underlying authori-
tarianism), the data are “behaving” exactly according to the expectations 
produced by the authoritarian dynamics theory. The correlations between 
the index of authoritarianism and intolerance, national exclusionism and 
stereotyping are higher in the areas that went through conflict than in the 
areas where conflict was absent. The theory postulates that, in a situation 
where threat does not exist (we are assuming that the areas where the 
conflict was avoided present such non-threatening situations), there will be 
no differences in expressing intolerance and similar anti-minority attitudes 
between non-authoritarians and authoritarians. The threatening situation (in 
our case the areas that were passing through conflict) triggers fears among 
authoritarians and that pushes up the authoritarianism and intolerance, ex-
clusionism and stereotyping correlations.
This interpretation ignores the statistical significance and is based on 
the “right” direction of the correlation coefficients. For example, neither 
authoritarianism and the national exclusionism correlation in peaceful areas, 
nor in the conflict areas, reaches statistical significance.
The same result holds for the second part of the Table 1 when the 
question about child-rearing values is used as an indicator of authoritarian-
ism. None of the observed coefficients reaches the statistical significance 
levels. But all of them are “behaving” in accordance with theoretical ex-
pectations, meaning that the correlation of authoritarianism and dependent 
variables (intolerance, exclusion and stereotyping) is higher in the conflict 
areas than in the peaceful ones. In the case of intolerance, it rises from 
-.010 to -.061, in the case of national exclusionism it is from .007 to .013 
and in the case of stereotyping from -.015 to .034.
In spite of the low value of the observed coefficients, we can conclude 
that the relationship in all six observed cases is in the direction predicted 
by the theory. In the areas that did not go through conflict, the correlation 
of authoritarianism with the indicators of intolerance, exclusion and stere-
otypes is smaller than in the areas that went through conflict. The theory 
says that threat (in our case, the occurrence of conflict during the war 
operations) will have a different influence on people with authoritarian 
predispositions than those without them. “The authoritarians” will become 
more intolerant (and more favourably predisposed towards exclusion, and 
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more stereotyped). Conflict will have an opposite effect on those who are 
non-authoritarians, who will activate their inclinations toward tolerance 
(and also become less inclined toward exclusion and less stereotyped). 
And it looks as though this is exactly what was happening. As a conse-
quence, using two measures of authoritarianism (the authoritarianism in-
dex and the question about the child-rearing practices) in each particular 
case and three different measures of attitudes – tolerance, exclusion and 
stereotyping – the correlations went in the predicted way, that is, they 
increased as a result of conflict. The explanation for this observation in 
accordance with the theory is that people with authoritarian predispositions 
reacted to conflict with an increase in intolerance, exclusion attitudes and 
stereotypes. In situations with no conflict, these predispositions stayed la-
tent and were not mobilized. As a consequence, the correlation of authori-
tarianism and the attitudes increased in the conflict areas, when compared 
with the areas that stayed peaceful. That also means that the dichotomy 
of peace and conflict areas operates as a valid indication of the normative 
threat dimension that, according to the authoritarian dynamics theory, is 
the only valid conceptualization of the variable operating as mobilization 
of the authoritarians.
Feeling of threat
We tested the same problem using different measures of threat. This time 
threat was not measured by comparing local situations of conflict and 
peace, but rather indicators of perception of threat, ignoring the contextual 
situation in which that perception occurs. We divided the population on the 
basis of the feeling of threat. The feeling of threat was measured in two 
dimensions. The first one was the threat felt by the return of refugees. The 
second dimension was the feeling of threat at the prospect of joining the 
European Union.
It is worth noting that there is a significantly different distribution of 
these two different threats in the observed populations. In general, people 
do not feel threatened by the return of refugees. What is interesting is that 
the feeling of threat caused by the return of refugees is greater in peaceful 
than in the conflict areas.
This fact is interesting, especially taking into account that the national 
structure of the conflict areas was drastically changed in comparison with 
the peace areas. In Gospić for example, the share of Serbs fell from 31% 
in 1981 to less than 5% in 2001, in spite of the significant rise in the total 
population by almost 50% from 8,785 to 12,980. It has been the other way 
around in the peaceful area of Vrbovsko, the proportion of Serbs having 
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increased from 31% to 36% in the same period, despite the decline in the 
total population from 7,344 to 6,047. That reflects a general trend with lo-
cal variations, in which the areas of conflict are characterized by significant 
decline of ethnic Serbian population, while that is not the case in the peace-
ful areas. The number of Serbs declined in smaller proportions or even, as 
in Vrbovsko, increased. Their proportion in Plaški fell from 86% to 46%, 
and in Pakrac from 30% to 17%. In the situation of the significant decline 
of population from 1,127 to 860, the proportion of Serbs has increased 
from 3% to 19% only in Saborsko. In Rovinj, in the situation of popula-
tion expansion from 11,271 to 14,234, the proportion of Serbs fell from 5% 
to 3.5% (from 557 to 500 in absolute numbers). There was a significant 
decline in Daruvar in proportions from 24% to 14% in the situation of a 
significant increase in population from 9,661 to 13,243.
Table 3. % of respondents who thought that the return of refugees and 
those exiled would negatively influence some aspect of social life6
Aspect of life threatened Peace Conflict
Traditions and customs 22.99 15.76
National identity 23.46 15.50
Language and dialect 22.27 13.18
Employment 24.17 17.57
Entrepreneurship 25.36 17.83
Living standard 24.41 15.50
Functioning of local government 26.54 15.76
Activity of political parties 27.49 18.60
Security (public order) 25.12 13.70
It is extremely difficult to find an explanation as to why people feel 
more threatened with the prospect of the return of refugees in the peaceful 
areas. One possible reason could be one that showed up in the in-depth 
interviews (not discussed in this paper) where people in the peaceful ar-
eas described those who had left as “trouble-makers” and were afraid 
of their return. On the other hand, we can conclude that the feeling of 
threat from the return of refugees is not particularly high. In the worst 
case in the peaceful areas, 26% of respondents evaluated that the return 
6 The question was: Evaluate how the return of refugees influences different aspects of 
community life in your community. Then different dimensions were numerated, such as 
traditions and customs; national identity etc. The respondents could choose between nega-
tive influence, non-influence and positive influence. Here is the percentage of those choos-
ing a negative answer.
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would endanger the functioning of local government. On average, ¾ of 
the population, or even around 85% in the conflict areas, did not see 
such return negatively, while some even evaluated that the return could 
have some positive effects. (Close to half of respondents claimed that the 
return would have positive effects on different spheres of social life.) In 
general, we can say that positive attitudes prevailed over negative ones 
regarding the refugees return. This prevalence is only less intensive in 
the peaceful areas.
Regarding perceptions on the consequences of Croatia becoming a 
member of the European Union, we can observe as follows: 75% of re-
spondents in conflict areas and 79% in peaceful areas claimed that the at-
tractive real estate would be bought up by foreigners when Croatian joined 
Europe; Croatian citizens would become servants in their own country was 
the claim of 48% of respondents in the conflict areas and 50% in the 
peaceful areas. There is only somewhat more optimism regarding Croatian 
culture, customs and tradition. Thirty-one percent of respondents in conflict 
areas and 25% in the peaceful areas believe that they will be destroyed 
with Croatia joining the European Union. We can conclude that people 
feel threatened by joining Europe and that there is no difference between 
peaceful and conflict areas in this regard. We should not be confused by 
the signs pointing in different directions, since the direction depends on 
the question formulation. We are concentrating here on the analysis of the 
negative dimension of “joining Europe”, ignoring some positive dimen-
sions that are also getting wide support such as, for example, the fact that 
people believe that international esteem for Croatia will be increased. That 
is the opinion of almost 50% of respondents in conflict areas and 40% in 
peaceful areas.
Returning to the authoritarian dynamics theory, we ask the question of 
whether the feeling of threat (in the first instance, perception of threat in 
the return of refugees) increases intolerance, exclusion attitudes and stere-
otypes in those being authoritarian more than in those who are not. As a 
consequence, we can expect the correlation of authoritarianism and intoler-
ance, exclusion and stereotypes being higher among those who feel threat-
ened than those who do not.
This differences between conflict and peaceful areas are presented here 
only as illustration. We are more interested in the prediction derived from 
the theory indicating that the authoritarianism-tolerance correlation among 
those perceiving threat will be higher than among those who don’t. The da-
ta show the correlation of authoritarianism and tolerance, national exclusion 
and stereotypes among those who feel threatened and those who don’t.
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Table 4. Threat of return7 and attitudinal variables





Tolerance index -.029 (.258) 519
Threatened “ “ -.111 (.124) 111
Not 
threatened
“ National exclusion 
index -.008 (.432) 520
Threatened “ “ .055 (.282) 111
Not 
threatened
“ National stereotypes 
index -.006 (.449) 518
Threatened “ “ .105 (.136) 111
Very similarly to the instance when we compared peace and conflict 
areas, none of the correlation coefficients reach statistical significance. 
We can interpret the obtained data from that standpoint, that is, that au-
thoritarianism and our indices of tolerance, exclusion and stereotypes are 
not significantly correlated and that we cannot corroborate the theory. 
But, on the other hand, even if none of the coefficients reach signifi-
cance in all of the three observed cases when we compare those who 
feel threatened and those who don’t, the magnitude of the coefficients 
turns in the theoretically expected direction. Namely, the correlation of 
authoritarianism and our dependent variables is always greater and in 
the expected direction when more people feel threatened than those who 
do not. In the first case of the relationship of threat and tolerance, the 
difference is the correlation of -.029 if the people don’t feel threatened 
and -.111 if they do. Because that is actually the index of tolerance, 
the meaning of these coefficients is that the correlation is more negative 
among those who feel threatened. In the case of the two other indices, 
the situation is that the coefficient changes from negative to positive. 
That means that when people do not feel threatened there is no difference 
between authoritarians and non-authoritarians and, actually, that authori-
tarians are even marginally less exclusive than non-authoritarians. On the 
other hand, a perception of threat leads to  differentiation in national 
7 The threat of return variable was constructed on the basis of nine items asking respond-
ents how the return of refugees would reflect itself on different dimensions of community 
life. (See the previous footnote.) Those obtaining the score from 5 to 9 (meaning that 
they see negative effects of return in five or more dimensions of social life) are treated as 
“threatened by the return”. We have 111 such respondents. On the other hand, we have 519 
not threatened. The rest of the sample are in the middle of the scale (neither threatened 
nor positive towards return) and are omitted from the analysis.
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exclusion attitudes among authoritarians but not among the non-authori-
tarians and, as a consequence, we have a jump in correlation from -.008 
to .055, meaning that, if they perceive the threat, authoritarians are more 
exclusive than non-authoritarians.. The difference between those who feel 
threatened and those who don’t is even greater in the case of stereotypes. 
The correlation between authoritarianism and stereotypes is -.006 among 
those who do not feel threatened and it jumps to .105 among those who 
feel threatened. Thus, the conclusion is that, when people feel threatened, 
those who are authoritarians react by increasing their intolerance, and, 
consequently, the correlation between authoritarianism and intolerance, 
and exclusion and stereotypes is greater among those who feel threatened 
than among those who do not. We could argue that the data confirm the 
theory.
We made the same analysis in the next panel, but used the feeling of 
threat from Europe as the indication of feelings of threat.
Table 5. Threat from Europe8 and attitudinal variables





Tolerance index .086 (.291)  43
Threatened “ “ -.131 (.023) 233
Not 
threatened
“ National exclusion .069 (.331)  43
Threatened “ “ -.014 (.414) 233
Not 
threatened
“ National stereotypes .214 (.084)  43
Threatened “ “ .042 (.262) 232
It would seem at first glance that only the first set of two correla-
tions is in accordance with our theory. Namely, among those who feel 
more threatened the correlation of authoritarianism and tolerance is higher 
(-.131), the negative sign indicating that they are less tolerant than those 
8 The index of the threat from Europe was constructed on the basis of the perceived 
negative consequences of joining Europe. Five items were used: destruction of Croatian 
customs and tradition, danger for the Croatian language, foreigners will buy up property, 
Croats will become servants in their own country, Croatia will be swamped by foreign 
workers. The Likert type scale was used for answers from 1, meaning non-acceptance of 
the statement, to 5 meaning full agreement. Those whose average answer was between 4 
and 5 (N=233) were treated as threatened by Europe and those between 1 and 2 as non-
threatened (N=43).
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who don’t feel threatened (.086). However, it looks as though the sec-
ond two sets of correlations are contrary to that expected by the theory. 
Namely, the correlations of authoritarianism and national exclusion and 
national stereotypes are higher among those who do not feel threatened. 
(We are again ignoring the statistical significance.) We will show that, 
actually, these two correlations are in accordance with the theory and 
that only the authoritarianism tolerance correlation requires explanation 
as an exception.
We should step back for a moment and return to the original au-
thoritarian dynamics theory. In the part of the book when the changing 
conceptions of “us” and “them” is analyzed, the author shows that, in 
experimental situations where the threat is represented by aliens, authori-
tarians decrease their level of racial intolerance. Namely, the aliens are 
a “new enemy”, different from the racial minority. A new boundary be-
tween “us” (now including the racial minority) and “them” (aliens) is 
drawn. If we return to the basic idea of tolerance, we should remember 
that its basic component is rejection of difference. At the same, whoever 
is different can change, depending on the situation and on the charac-
teristic of the threat. Europe, like the aliens in Stunners’ experiments, 
redraws the boundaries between “us” and “them”. When threatened by 
Europe, the exclusion of local minorities, (the items speaking about  in-
terethnic marriages, mixing of people in schools and interethnic friend-
ships) goes down, because these are now “our” people and we all are 
equally threatened by the dangerous Europe. The same probably holds for 
the stereotypes about national groups. We assume that when asked these 
questions, people answer within the frame of “local” national groups. 
They decrease their stereotyping of “local” minorities when they feel 
threatened by certain “aliens” from Europe, who will buy up property 
and endanger local culture. Under the pressure of the “common enemy” 
(in this case, Europe), national exclusion and stereotyping is less corre-
lated with authoritarianism among those who feel threatened than among 
those who don’t. The “ad hoc” interpretation for the fact that the au-
thoritarianism-tolerance correlation does not behave in that way could 
be that tolerance is a deeper personality structure, which stays intact 
when attitudes that are nearer to the “surface”, such as exclusion and 
stereotypes, are changing under changed conditions. Basically, we obtain 
the same picture treating the question about  child-rearing practices as 
independent.
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Table 6. The correlation between the question on child-rearing practices 
and tolerance, national exclusion and national stereotyping





Tolerance -.009 (.418) 517
Threatened “ “ -.018 (.426) 111
Not 
threatened
“ National exclusion .002 (.483) 518
Threatened “ “ .011 (.453) 111
Not 
threatened
“ Stereotyping index -.017 (.347) 516
Threatened “ “ -.082 (.197) 111
None of the coefficients reach the level of statistical significance, but 
the differences between threatened and non-threatened are exactly in the 
direction predicted by the theory. Namely, the correlation coefficients be-
tween the authoritarianism independent variables of tolerance, national ex-
clusion and stereotypes among those threatened are higher than among the 
non-threatened. In the situation of threat (measured by the perceived threat 
of the return of refugees), authoritarianism (measured by the authoritarian 
index or just the question of  child-rearing practices) triggers intolerance, 
stereotyping and national exclusion.
The situation is different again when the threat is represented by “join-
ing Europe”.
Table 7. The correlation of authoritarianism and tolerance, exclusion, and 
stereotypes when people feel and don’t feel threatened by the Europe-
joining process





Tolerance -.047 (.382)  43
Threatened “ “ -.035 (.300) 233
Not 
threatened
“ National exclusion -.029 (.427)  43
Threatened “ “ .019 (.389) 233
Not 
threatened
“ Stereotyping index .032 (.420)  43
Threatened “ “ .007 (.455) 232
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If we accept the theoretical expectations that those having an authoritar-
ian predisposition are becoming more tolerant toward minorities under this 
specific threat, we can see that two of the observed pairs of correlations are 
behaving in the expected way. Those who feel threatened are showing less 
negative correlation with tolerance and lower correlation with stereotyping. 
The exception is the correlations with national exclusion, where those who 
feel threatened are showing a higher authoritarianism-exclusion correlation.
Conclusions
The authoritarian dynamics theory states that there is no difference be-
tween those with authoritarian predispositions and those without regarding 
different attitudes expressing tolerance toward the “others”, when there is 
no normative threat present. The situation of normative threat acts differ-
ently upon authoritarians and non-authoritarians. The authoritarians raise 
their general intolerance and, in these situations, the correlation of differ-
ent tolerance measures and authoritarianism increases. This is not expected 
to happen among those not having this authoritarian predisposition. There 
is also a prediction that under a specific threat that could be perceived 
as a “common enemy” authoritarians react by decreasing their intolerance 
toward “internal others”, who are then becoming allies against the new 
common enemy.
We used two basic indicators of threat in our research. One is the 
division between the areas in which there was an open conflict (threat 
situation) and in which there was none (non-threatening situation). In addi-
tion to this quasi-experimental manipulation, we used survey data to detect 
those who felt threatened by the return of refugees and by the process of 
joining Europe (ignoring the distribution of those who felt threatened be-
tween the peace and conflict areas).
Authoritarianism was measured on two ways. Firstly, by using the 
question of child-rearing practices (very similarly to Stenner) and also us-
ing an index of authoritarianism developed on the basis of factor analysis 
of a larger number of value questions and the obtained factor, which can 
be labelled as authoritarianism.
We used three indices as dependent variables, also obtained by the 
factor analytical procedure of tolerance, national exclusion and national 
stereotyping. The following table summarizes the key information obtained 
from all the comparisons of correlations coefficients between authoritarian-
ism and attitudes toward the “others” in threatening and non-threatening 
situations. This is indicated whether the switch of the correlation coefficient 
happens in accordance with the authoritarian dynamics theory, or not.
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Table 8. Indicating the difference of authoritarianism and tolerance, 






Is the difference 











“ National exclusion Yes




“ National exclusion Yes






“ National exclusion Yes
“ Stereotyping index Yes
Threat from 
Europe
“ Tolerance Index No
“ National exclusion Yes






“ National exclusion Yes




“ National exclusion No
“ Stereotyping index Yes
Table 8 shows that of the 18 pairs of correlations (differences between 
threatening and non-threatening situations) 16 pairs are behaving in accord-
ance with our theoretical predictions and only two pairs contrary to expec-
tations. This proportion is far too high to have been obtained by chance. 
On the other hand, some alternative explanations are always possible with 
this type of data, but we are not entering into that aspect because of space 
limitations. Since so many of the observed facts are exactly in accordance 
with our theory (leaving aside the question of statistical significance and 
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discussing only the direction in which the coefficients are pointing), we are 
arguing that the data are pointing toward the acceptance of the authoritarian 
dynamics theory. The substantial interpretation is that the threatening situ-
ation is prompting those with authoritarian predispositions to increase their 
intolerance, exclusion and stereotypes and, consequently, the correlation of 
authoritarianism with these dependent variables increases.
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Autoritarna dinamika: područja mira i sukoba i 
teorija autoritarne dinamike
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U radu se testiraju neke osnovne postavke teorije autoritarne dinamike Karen 
Stenner. Ideja je teorije da u normalnim situacijama nema razlike u toleranciji 
između autoritarnih i neautoritarnih osoba. Tek situacija normativne opasnosti 
dovodi do toga da oni s autoritarnim predispozicijama reagiraju s povećanom 
netolerantnošću. Posljedica je da možemo očekivati veću povezanost između au-
toritarnosti i tolerancije u situaciji opasnosti nego kad je nema. U ovom se radu 
empirijski potvrđuje da je korelacija autoritarnosti i tolerancije veća u onim po-
dručjima koja su prošla kroz međunacionalne sukobe kao i kod onih ljudi koji 
percipiraju da su više ugroženi povratkom izbjeglica i pridruživanjem Europskoj 
uniji. Kao empirijska podloga korišteni su podatci sakupljeni u područjima ko-
ja su bila izložena ratnim sukobima tijekom dezintegracije Jugoslavije (Gospić, 
Plaški, Pakrac) za razliku od onih u kojima takvih sukoba nije bilo (Vrbovsko, 
Rovinj, Daruvar).
Ključne riječi: autoritarnost, teorija autoritarne dinamike, autoritarna ličnost, 
etnički sukob, etnički mir
